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Abstract—Data from utility meters (gas, electricity, water) is
a rich source of information for distribution companies, beyond
billing. In this paper we present a supervised technique, which
primarily but not only feeds on meter information, to detect meter
anomalies and customer fraudulent behavior (meter tampering).
Our system detects anomalous meter readings on the basis of
models built using machine learning techniques on past data.
Unlike most previous work, it can incrementally incorporate the
result of field checks to grow the database of fraud and non-
fraud patterns, therefore increasing model precision over time
and potentially adapting to emerging fraud patterns. The full
system has been developed with a company providing electricity
and gas and already used to carry out several field checks, with
large improvements in fraud detection over the previous checks
which used simpler techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Utility companies provide an essential service to devel-
oped societies, supplying electricity, gas and water to homes,
businesses and factories. The necessary infrastructure that
guarantees services includes from the kilometers of pipes or
lines that transport the energy to the millions of meters that
monitors consumption of individual customers. An important
problem that these companies face is the imbalance between
the energy billed with respect to the energy provided, called
energy losses. Non-technical losses is a widely used, somewhat
euphemistic name including fraud and meter malfunctions
among other.
Methods for committing fraud include splicing the pipes to
bypass the meter, tampering with the meter to stop it or to slow
it down, and simply connecting to the distribution network
without even having a contract with the company or a meter.
On the other hand, an accidental malfunction of the meter also
results in net energy loss for the company. For brevity, along
this paper, we will use the term fraud to refer to both forms
of non-technical loss, intentional fraud and meter malfunction:
The company actions and revenue after the detection will be
very different1, but both are issues that the company wants to
detect and fix as early as possible, and the detection schemes
are essentially the same.
1In case of detecting a fraud, the current regulation in Spain establishes
billing the consumption corresponding to six hours per day during a year, if
the real energy consumed during the fraud period cannot be determined.
Most cases of fraud involving meter tampering or malfunc-
tioning can be detected by direct inspection by a trained tech-
nician. However, it is extremely expensive to send technicians
to inspect a large number of meters. Therefore, companies
usually perform a pre-selection of a subset of meters to be
directly verified by technicians in a given period of time and
area, a concept that we call a campaign. Every customer visit
has a cost, so in order to be worthwhile campaigns need to
have relatively high precision (i.e., percentage of problems
detected with respect to the number of meters verified).
Company gains, on the other hand, are directly proportionally
to campaign recall (i.e., fraction of the existing fraud that
is detected), so campaign design is all about the classical
precision-recall tradeoff.
Traditionally, campaigns are based on simple sets of rules
indicating fraud (e.g., abrupt decrease of consumption, or
no consumption during a long period of time). These rules
can be used to detect the fraudulent/irregular customers, but
achieve a low success rate, not much higher than selecting
customers for the campaign at random. This can be explained
by many other reasons besides the fraud (e.g. customer spends
a long convalescence in the hospital, or the house is a second
residence that does not follow the consumption patterns of a
all-year home). It is very natural to try to exploit data from
the past to design better campaigns, including statistical and
machine-learning based techniques.
This paper introduces a dynamic supervised approach to
detect fraud and irregularities in a energy utility company.
Overall, we encode the detection of fraud as a classification
problem, where supervised techniques over the set of historic
cases of fraud are applied. Remarkably, the system contin-
uously evolves its knowledge by incorporating the results
of each campaign in order to improve model quality and
obtain more efficient campaigns. Our development has been
based on real datasets from a utility company and has already
served several campaigns of different kinds (city and country,
electricity and gas). As we will argue, the approach proposed is
a significant step towards automating the detection of fraud and
irregularities in the consumption of energy, when compared
to the traditional rule-based approach that nowadays utility
companies apply. But it also improves on most machine
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learning approaches described in the literature, which build
a classifier offline on a single dataset to be employed for a
long time.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II highlights
some related work and the differences with ours. In Section III
we describe the gathering and processing of the data. In
Section IV we provide a detailed description of the architecture
of the system. Then in Section V we report the results on actual
campaigns. Finally, Section VI presents some conclusions and
sketches future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Detection of fraud or irregularities (the non-technical losses
or NTL) has received considerable attention in the last
decades; see for instance [10], [4] for the particular case of
electricity. In this section we focus on recent approaches [13],
[11], [12], [3], [5], [2], [9], [6], [7].
Several perspectives have been taken when facing the
problem of NTL in electricy. They range from game-based
computational models [2], combinations of statistical tech-
niques [3], supervised machine learning [12], [5], [6], [7], and
time series [13], [11]. Works such as [9] focus specifically on
the important process of feature selection. Differences with
our work include:
• Existing work focuses on a single source of energy
(electricity). Since the company providing our study
case distributes both electricity and gas, we exploit the
correlations among consumptions to improve detection in
either, when possible. This feature has been incorporated
recently, but preliminary studies on correlation indicate
that it helps in detecting fraud.
• Most related work considers a single source of con-
sumption information, often the one obtained from smart
meters. In this work we combine consumption data from
different sources, in particular reliable information from
smart meters and nonreliable information (estimated or
self-reported) for users having older, non-smart meters –
which will be prevalent in large parts of the world for a
while.
• In most related work, a classifier or combination of
classifiers is created after analysis of a single historical
dataset, and built into the detection system. Improving
the models requires a human analyst analyzing more or
newer data. We implement a continuously running system
that “closes the loop”: The results of campaigns are given
as feedback to the system, in order to incrementally
retrain the models. The feedback also suggests specific
campaigns, not imagined a priori, upon discovering in-
teresting niches of customers with higher-than-average
fraud. The system might use drift management methods to
adapt to changes in customer behavior and fraud methods.
III. DATA PROCESSING
Gas Natural Fenosa, from now on “the company” is a utility
company distributing both electricity and gas in Spain and 26
countries of 5 continents. The project started in mid 2013 when
the company approached UPC researchers looking to improve
the rate of fraud and anomaly detection of their current
campaigns, which were based on a set of simple heuristic rules.
The information potentially available was consumption records
for any subset of their customers for several years, some
static information of each customer, and a limited number of
reports corresponding to verified fraud cases in the past. This
information, its strengths and limitations is described in this
section.
The project gradually evolved from the original goal of
“mining” one specific dataset to create a one-time campaign
to the development of a software system that connects to
the company’s operational system for generating both routine
campaigns and on-demand parameterized campaigns, manag-
ing feedback, and investigating the usefulness of new features,
among other functionalities.
A. The Datasets
The first dataset received from the company was to be used
to generate a static campaign (no software system). It came
from a medium-size city with a few thousand electricity cus-
tomers and another few thousand gas customers, and contained
contract information (e.g., the tariff or the age of the meter)
and about two years of consumption information. After this
initial dataset, we received four more datasets with similar
characteristics (i.e. cities with thousands of customers), either
of gas or electricity or both. From the sixth dataset onwards,
and in view of the good results of the initial campaigns, we
were given access to data at the country scale, with information
of several million customers in gas and another several million
of customers in electricity; around a million customers are
customers of both utilities. The last dataset used comprises the
time period from June 2012 in electricity and from November
2012 in gas to today.
The sources of data used so far in the project include
consumption and profile data (with a total of almost 200
millions of monthly information in electricity, and around 225
millions of monthly information in gas), historical fraud cases,
and some external information.
a) Consumption data: This is the data reflecting the
energy used by the customers. It includes meter readings
as well as billing extractions - the invoices the company
charges to the customer based on the meter readings or,
when not available, an estimate by the company based on
historical information. In this paper, we call a consumption
reading the difference between consecutive meter readings of
the customer; they will be our main source to extract the
consumption data; Figure 1 is an example. Note that from
this information one cannot detect the fraud cases in which
someone connects directly to the distribution network rather
than e.g. manipulating the meter; this type of fraud can only
be detected further upstream.
The origin and reliability of consumption data is varied. In
electricity, about half the customers have smart meters that
send customer consumption to the utility company monthly
and reliably. The other customers have old meters that require
Fig. 1: Example customer consumption record. In light gray, useful information (new readings and monthly consumption). In
dark gray, non-useful information (i.e. erroneous information is crossed out, in italic repated readings, with a dash months
without readings). Non-smart meters give less acurate monthly consumptions; in this case, the first October reading is obviously
wrong, so apportioned consumption because we have new readings every two months. Since the second July, consumption
readings are reliable because a smart meter was installed.
18% 36%
46%
Readings from smart meters
Unique old-meter readings
Repeated old-meter readings
32%
36%
32%
customers <12 smart readings
customers 12-24 smart readings
customers >24 smart readings
Fig. 2: Half the customers for electricity have smart meters.
From all the readings we have, 18% come from the smart
meters, 36% are unique readings from old meters and 46% are
repeated. Of the customers that have smart meters, around 32%
have less than 12 smart-meter readings, 36% have between 12
and 24 readings and the rest have more than 24 readings.
42%
58%
Unique gas readings
Repeated gas readings
Fig. 3: 42% of the readings from gas are unique, and 58%
are repeated. In gas, the absence of smart meters makes the
information available less reliable.
manual readings: Customers are expected to use any of a
number of options to send the reading (calling the company,
sending the reading via mail or a mobile app, or writing it
down on a paper available in the building). In gas there are
no smart meters yet, so all the information is sent manually.
When there are no smart meters and the customer has
not provided the reading, the company needs to estimate the
consumption of the customer using reference values from
similar historical periods. Customer-generated readings are
notoriously unreliable and error-prone, and many customers
simply do not send any for many months in a row. Eventually a
technician will be sent to read the meter, but only after several
months of estimated readings. Fortunately, each consumption
record is labeled as company verified, customer provided or
estimated, so we can assign them different reliabilities.
Erroneous, absurd or missing readings for non-smart me-
ters, the co-existence of two metering systems with different
reading periodicity (1 vs. 2 month between readings), and the
fact that some customers changed from one system to another
in the process (a small proportion of clients have more than
two years of smart-readings) were complications that we had
to deal when reading, parsing, and standarizing consumption
data.
b) Static Profile Data: Within this concept we include
information related to the contract of the customer with the
company (e.g. the tariff), information of the customer (e.g.
their address) and characteristics of the equipment (e.g. the
age and model of the meter, whether it is inside or outside
the house). This information can be used to categorize the
customer; for example, the tariff indicates whether it is a home,
a shop or a restaurant, and whether a gas cooker or central
heating is present.
c) Historical Fraud Cases: For the first campaign, we
were also provided a list of customers who had commited
fraud and were discovered in baseline campaigns carried out
by the company in the recent past years. The list included
several tens of thousands of verified fraud cases which could
be joined with their consumption data to investigate fraud
patterns. No “negative cases” (i.e., clients that were known
to not commit fraud) were received.
d) External Information: We used as well the Koppen
climate classification data of the different regions under study,
as climate obviously affects energy consumption patterns, as
well as census data about socioeconomic classification of cities
and regions.
B. Creating a Classification Problem
We now comment on the three main issues we had to tackle
when transforming the data into a classification problem.
a) Unreliability in Consumption Data: As discussed
before, consumption data as given by the readings may not
be an exact picture of the consumption of the customer but
an approximation, because the heterogeneous channels used to
obtain the readings. For instance, in Figure 1 one can see that
the reading in February is wrong, according to the readings
in January and March. A small number of heuristics were
designed to correct or discard suspicious or inconsistent data,
both in gas and electricity (e.g. discard a reading smaller than
the previous and the following reading, or discard an absurdly
high reading for a month, replacing them with interpolations).
Billing information is also used, but as a secondary source
compared to actual or estimated readings.
b) Statistical evaluation of the features: The main metric
used to evaluate the features is the odds ratio (the odds that
an outcome will occur given a particular case, in comparison
to the odds that the outcome will occur otherwise), from
now on denoted as OR. For each feature, we analyze the OR
between the results from the feedback (e.g. the OR between the
fraudulent clients against the non-fraudulent clients), denoted
as ORPN, as well as the OR between the fraudulent clients
against all the clients not included in any campaign, denoted
as ORPG. Table I shows the odds ratios of some features used.
c) Feature construction: Consumption, profile, and ex-
ternal information was combined to create a number of fea-
tures. These features are the result of an evolution of the
initial rules used by the company for their baseline campaigns
(e.g. the detection of customers with a long period of time
with no consumption). Yet, each rule used in the baseline
campaigns used one or at most two of the features, while
we expected machine-learning-based algorithms to be more
accurate by taking into account hundreds of features as well
as their combinations.
Variables ORPG ORPN
Abrupt decrease
of consumption
18.6 3.4
Long period of low
consumption
6.2 3.0
High consumption
discrepancy
10.4 2.4
High range higher
lower consumption
12.2 2.0
Gas consumption
without electricity
11 2.9
TABLE I: Significant odds-ratio of some features from the
electricity campaigns. Both the odds-ratio between the fraud-
ulent and non-fraudulent customers (ORPN) and the odds-
ratio between the fraudulent customers and the customers not
included in any campaign (ORPG) are included.
Some features focus on the behavior of the customers in
comparison to themselves: An abrupt or gradual decrease in
their consumption exemplified in Figure 4, a repeated lack
of reported readings, a substantially different pattern from
previous years, consumption peaks (as seen in Figure 7), the
difference between the minimum and the maximum consump-
tion of the customer, etc..
Feature Definition
Abrupt decrease
of consumption
A reduction of x% in consumption during n months
in comparison to the previous n months.
Abrupt decrease
of equivalent
consumption
A reduction of x% in consumption during n months
in comparison to the same months from the previous
year.
Long period of
low consumption
A reduction of x% in consumption during n months
in comparison to the average.
Consumption dis-
crepancy
High/medium/low discrepancy between a consumption
in comparison to the average.
Decrease of con-
sumption (correla-
tion)
A consumption reduction during n months using Pear-
son correlation.
Tariff Tariff of the customer.
Location of the
meter
Location of the meter (e.g. inside/outside the house)
Contracted power Contracted power (only in electricity).
Consumption
peak
Consumption in a month x% times higher/lower than
the previous and the following month.
Electric tension Electric tension (only in electricity).
Abnormal
contractual status
The client has abnormal contractual status (e.g. has
canceled the contract with the company).
Regional income Whether the customer lives in a region with an average
income above, similar or below the Spainish average.
Climatology Ko¨ppen climatology classification of the region where
the customer lives.
Billing/consumption
similarity
Similarity between the consumption computed and the
billing (only in gas).
Reading periodic-
ity
Reading periodicity (1 or 2 months, only in electricity).
Unknown
consumption
Number of consecutive estimated readings, consecu-
tive 0 consumption (in the present and historically),
Difference
between years
Highest difference between the consumption of two
consecutive years, or if the customer has been con-
suming less year after year (only in gas).
Gas consumption
without electricity
Gas consumption without electricity.
Number of read-
ings
High/medium/low number of different readings from
the customer.
Province The province where the customer lives.
Capital province Whether the customer lives in a capital of a province.
Date information Age of the meter, date of installation and contract.
Difference of con-
sumption
High/medium/low difference between the higher and
the lower consumption of the customer.
Ratio difference
of consumption
High/medium/low difference between the average con-
sumption of the customer and the average consump-
tion.
Negative
Consumption
Whether the customer has a negative consumption (e.g.
count was reset at the installation of a new meter).
Reading
correction
Whether the consumption obtained required a correc-
tion.
Smart meters Whether the customer has a smart meter.
Old fraud Whether the customer was detected as fraudulent by
the company in gas or electricity in the past.
TABLE II: Types of features extracted from the data available.
In some cases several versions of the feature are included in the
system (e.g. abrupt decrease of consumption, where different
x% and n lead to different features, or using Spanish and
regional averages to compute different features).
Other variables measure the inconsistencies of the customer
consumption in comparison to other similar customers. For
example, long periods of time where the customer consumes
much less than the average of the customers with the same
tariff (exemplified in Figure 6), high discrepancy between
the consumption curve of the customer and the typical con-
sumption curve of the customers with the same tariff (a flat
consumption line showing no seasonality pattern may indicate
that the metering has been tampered to not exceed a certain
metering speed, as seen in 5), nominal difference between the
consumption of the customer and the average consumption of
the clients with the same tariff, etc.
It is worth mentioning the features that combine informa-
tion from gas and electricity consumption (e.g. the behavior
comparison between the gas and electricity consumption,
or the consumption of gas without electricity consumption,
exemplified in 8). These features, tested statistically, were only
included in the most recent campaigns, which are the more
successful ones.
From the static data we also extract some features; the
province where the customer lives as well as its climatology,
the location of the meter, the date of installation of the meter,
etc. Table II contains a list with the feature types included in
our system.
These variables were all binarized, for uniformity and sim-
plicity; in particular, this avoids problems with algorithms that
are too sensitive to outliers or extreme values. For example,
one binary variable was introduced for each tariff type that a
customer may have. In some cases, several variants of the same
variable were introduced, corresponding to different horizons
or thresholds; for example, whether there has been a reduction
of x% in the last n months generates many variables for
varying x and n. For each candidate variable, the ORPG was
checked, and those variables with values near 1 that were not
useful (e.g. did not have profiling information) were removed.
All in all, the number of variables included in the campaigns
has been growing over time reaching 250 features in the
latest electricity campaign and 150 features in the latest gas
campaign.
At the end of this process, a customer is represented (with
the information available at the time of generating a campaign)
as a vector of binary variables, which we call the customer
profile.
Fig. 4: Example variable: Consumption drop.
d) Imbalanced Classification Problem: We created a
classification problem by labeling each customer profile in a
Fig. 5: Example variable: Consumption discrepancy. Customer
1 has a similar consumption curve than the average consump-
tion. On the other hand, both customer 2 and 3 have an
abnormal curve that might be an indicator of fraud.
Fig. 6: Example variable: Long period of low consumption.
As we can see, we have a period of time (from month 4 to 9)
where the customer consumes much less than the average.
Fig. 7: Example variable: Consumption peaks. We can see
that the customer has both a positive peak (4th month) and a
negative peak (11th consumption) in its consumption curve.
Fig. 8: Example variable: Gas Consumption without electricity
consumption. Gas heater needs electricity to work.
potential training dataset either with the positive class (P),
representing fraudulent behaviors, or the negative class (N)
representing non-fraudulent behavior. For populating P, we
considered customers from the historical fraud cases (see Sec-
tion III-A) and those detected as fraud in previous campaigns.
Populating N was a problem in the initial campaign, as we did
not have certified non-fraud cases; we simply took a random
sample of all customers, which should be approximately cor-
rect under the assumption that fraud prevalence is low enough.
As we started receiving feedback from the first campaigns, we
did have certified negatives.
The prediction desired from the system could be a P/N
value. In this case the campaign is simply an unordered set
of suspicious customers (predicted to be P). The company,
however, preferred to have a fraud scoring, or probability of
being fraud, for each customer, which makes the campaign an
ordered list; this allows to detect in-place that a campaign has
entered a point of diminshing returns.
IV. THE PROCESS
Our approach to detect fraud is based on supervised learning
algorithms that create models based on labeled data. This can
be explained as follows (see Figure 9):
1) From the data sources we extract all the necessary data
to create the variables.
2) We create a profile of each user, a vector of variable
values that defines their behavior up to a certain date.
3) Based on feedback from older campaigns, we run a
number of algorithms in a number of configurations to
determine which one could be best for this campaign.
4) We use the chosen model to compute a fraud score (a
prediction or probability) for every customer in the target
area for a new campaign. We exclude customers that have
been checked already in recent campaigns.
5) We create a campaign of a desired size N by selecting
the N customers with highest fraud score.
6) When the campaign results returns from the field, the
feedback (verified fraud and non-fraud cases) is added to
the system automatically2.
This methodology allows iterative learning from the feedback
from previous campaigns, as well as the addition of new algo-
rithms and variables. A detailed description of the procedure
is given below.
A. Initial Campaign
The first step in our approach is to create a model able to
learn the pattern frauds. Figure 10 illustrates this stage.
This step needs to be taken the first time we create a cam-
paign for a new population for which we have no feedback.
It is assumed however that some set of verified fraud cases is
available from the baseline campaigns by the company, which
are labeled P. A set of randomly chosen customers is selected
and labeled N, with the understanding that some labels may be
wrong. In our case, we needed to do this learning phase on the
2The company centralizes all the campaigns results introduced manually
by each technician in a database, and our system reads this information
automatically to update the feedback.
Fig. 9: System architecture. Campaigns are generated itera-
tively, allowing classifiers to improve based on their perfor-
mance.
Fig. 10: Generation of the first campaign. A model is created
using as positive examples the historical fraudulent customers,
and as negative examples a small random sample of the
population.
first campaign for a small city and for the first country-wide
campaign.
In all campaigns from the initial one in one population,
the training and test sets will contain verified positives and
negatives from previous campaigns.
B. The Campaign Phase
After the customers have been selected for a campaign, each
customer will have a fraudulent score, and the utility company
will select those with higher score that have not been verified
recently, and send technicians to check the corresponding
meters.
The results for each customer can be summarized as
Fraudulent, Non-fraudulent and Absent. Fraudulent are those
customers who have committed fraud or whose meter does not
mark (i.e. it does not correctly measure consumption). Non-
fraudulent customers are those whose meter could be checked
and showed no signs of tampering or malfunction. Finally,
absent customers are those for which the technician could not
have access to the meter. Absent customers are a significant
fraction of the campaign feedback. We do not include them in
our performance calculation or in the feedback to our system
(i.e., are labeled neither P nor N), although it is believed that
a fraud among these may be higher than average, because
fraudulent customers will try to avoid being inspected. The
field reports for the campaign contains a number of distinct
codes, some corresponding to malfunctioning meters and some
to true fraud; as mentioned, we do not differentiate them in
our system and label them all as positive for the feedback.
Finally, the system needs to process the results of the
campaign. The profiles of the users from the campaign are
stored with its corresponding P/N label. This labeled data will
be used as training data in the following campaigns.
C. Learning from Feedback
After feedback has been incorporated in the system, we have
additional verified fraud cases (in addition to those coming
from the baseline campaigns) and verified non-fraud cases.
These can be used now to train new models for further
campaigns. Note that we decided not to include the baseline
fraud cases in the training sets of further campaigns because
there was no guarantee that the profiles at the time the
campaign was performed were indicative of the fraud. The
company could have chosen them for inspection based on
behavior previous to the records we were given, or based on
side information not included in the records. Direct feedback
information was considered more reliable.
Fig. 11: In the Feedback phase, we study several models
using the feedback profiles and choose the best one (or best
combination) to assign to each customer a fraud score.
D. Algorithmic Details
Many classifier-building algorithms with different configu-
rations have been tested so far. Those that have up to now
contributed to real campaigns include:
• Naive Bayes.
• K-nearest neighbors: Different number of neighbors and
distance weight have been tested.
• Decision Tree inducers, including C4.5 and CART: Both
Gini and Entropy split criteria as well as the number of
features used were tuned.
• Neural Networks with backpropagation training: The
learning rate, momentum, epochs, the number of hidden
layers and the number of errors allowed have been
parameterized.
• Support Vector Machines: both linear and radial basis
kernel functions have been tested. We have also tuned
the cost for misclassification as well as the gamma (for
the RBF kernel).
• Random Forests: the number of iterations, as well as
the parameters tuned in the Decision Tree have been
modified.
• Gradient descent Decision Tree with CART: besides the
optimization applied in the Random Forest, we have also
seen how the loss function (deviance or exponential)
modifies the performance.
• AdaBoost with C4.5 decision trees, naive Bayes, and
PART: The number of iterations have been optimized.
The tools used to implement these algorithms are the Knime
Analytics Platform [1] and the scikit-learn Python library [8].
Fig. 12: Area-under-curve values of the algorithms applied to
the 4.5x feedback campaign in 4-fold cross validation. The
meta-algorithms (Gradient Boosting Decision Tree, Random
Forests, and AdaBoost with Naive Bayes) were the top per-
formers.
Initially we created fixed-size campaigns and the scoring
of each customer was boolean (predicted fraud or non-fraud),
so we optimized f-measure to balance precision and recall.
After the first campaign we wanted to assign a numerical
fraud score to each and every customer in order to create a
sorted list of all customers; the company could then choose
the size of the campaign going down the list as far as desired.
The metric to be optimized among configurations was then
the Area under Curve, to maximize the position in the list of
fraudulent customers rather than P/N hard classifications.
In the initial campaigns we combined several classifiers,
with the final scoring being the voting or average among their
individual scores. Furthermore, most algorithms can be run
in several configurations (e.g. parameter settings). Our system
semi-autonomously3 explores several configurations of each
algorithm and several candidate combinations (e.g., including
or not each algorithm and assigning voting weights). This
model choosing process is not fully automatized, in spite of
that it can be automatized using a classification-validation
cross-validation process, to facilitate our understanding and
post analysis of the results. In our most recent campaigns we
have opted for a single Gradient Boosting Model, because we
observed that it gave better AUC than any ensemble including
other algorithms (see Figure 10).
The campaigns are generated once a month, executed in
a commercial computer (i.e. not a cluster). For this reason,
we have prioritized the scalability of the software instead of
the performance speed. Depending on the input data (i.e. the
population or the number of months to compute) the system
can last from hardly an our to a day. With a fairly optimization
the software speed can be boost easily.
V. SOME RESULTS
Fig. 13: Comparison between the precision of the baseline
model and our methodology in a local population and in all
the country in our electricity campaigns.
Our first campaigns were conducted on three medium-
size locations (population between 50,000 and 100,000) to
experimentally test the efficiency of our methods to detect
electricity fraud without investing on large, costly campaigns.
It was soon clear that they achieved precision notably better
than the baseline.
To be precise, let us take precision as our main criteria, i.e.,
fraction of fraudulent users discovered among those inspected.
The size of the campaigns was equal to the baseline ones,
so we did not increase precision by simply inspecting less
3The choice of configuration is not totally automatized to facilitate our
understanding and post analysis of the results. This process can be fully
automatized using the validation-test case with the feedback information
easily.
Fig. 14: Comparison between the precision of the baseline
model and our methodology in all the country in our gas
campaigns.
customers. Then campaigns consisting of randomly chosen
customers had precision around z%4, and company baseline
campaigns had essentially no better results. Our three initial
campaigns had precision 12x, 5x, and 5x the baseline.
Encouraged by these results, the company proposed to
conduct a test at the country level (Spain) with several
million users, also to test the scalability of the approach
to detect electricity. We were provided with historical fraud
cases from the whole country, and returned the company a
list of several thousand of customers sorted by fraud score.
The company ran a campaign consisting of the top 10,000,
as that was the standard size of their baseline country-wide
campaigns. The campaign had precision 4.5x that of the
baseline. That is slightly less than the worst score achieved in
small populations, but of course much more than the baselines.
More interestingly, months later the company has conducted
a second campaign taking the next 10,000 customers from
the same list, which had lower scores, so a priori lower
precision was expected. Surprisingly, precision was again very
close to 4.5x the baseline. As a side-effect, the campaigns
have provided a dataset of 16,000 customers with reliable
fraud/non-fraud labels for further campaigns, the remaining
4,000 being “absent”.
The lower performance of the first country-wide campaign
(the one that achieved a 4.5x performance) with respect to the
best city-wide ones (12x) merited consideration. We attributed
this fact to the higher diversity of customer behavior, energy
rate usages, climates, and fraud patterns at the country level.
More generally, considering a large user base may blur the
patterns that affect only some subsets of customers.
If we break down the data and analyze the results of
our campaigns as partial results by the tariff (Figure 15),
the performances varies notably depending on the tariff; for
example, in the 4.5x campaign, the two most common tariffs
were those that achieved best performance). This can be read
as:
• The information of the less common customers is blurred
by that of the most common customers.
• We have less information from these customers, being
more difficult to profile and detect.
To fix all these problems we considered to:
4The exact figure is withheld at the request of the company but it is a small
1-digit percentage.
Fig. 15: Reading of the results of the country-wise campaigns.
Considering only the tariffs with at least 100 customers in the
campaign, the most common tariffs are those easier to detect
by our methodology.
• Take geographical proximity into account when comput-
ing variables that indicate anomaly with respect to other
customers. That is, “typicality” is considered with respect
to consumers in the same region (in particular, the same
climate).
• Also perhaps diversify the models taking into account
tariff, type of contract (home, restaurant, shop. . . ) and
other such factors.
• Therefore, develop a complex predictive model structure.
Instead of creating a single model for a campaign at
the country level, create many local models and patch
them together to create a campaign. Of course, controlling
overfitting may be a challenge in this approach.
We have started to introduce these solutions to the system.
Specifically, we have already introduced segmented features
(e.g. comparison consumption between a customer and the
customers from the same province). The following country-
wide campaign, that included this new information, boosted
the global performance and achieved a precision 15x the
baseline.
Another issue that required our attention was the evolution
of the software over time. It is expected that new fraudulent
behavior appears periodically, and in this context the infras-
tructure proposed in this paper is able to capture them. On
the other hand, two factors may prevent our (and similar)
techniques to continuously be more accurate:
• the appearance of new types of fraud/irregularities, not
captured by the learned models.
• The periodicity and size of the campaigns. The system
may tend to degrade the quality over time: when cam-
paigns are applied too often without new information or
the size of campaigns is too big.
To solve this problems, we consider to:
• Keep us a small % of the campaigns to explore, using
alternative methods (e.g. new features not included in the
system) to detect new fraudulent behaviors.
• In this case, the complex predictive model structure
explained to improve the results will be useful to structure
the periodicity of the campaigns to maximize the results.
We have seen that in spite of the smart meters can detect
autonomously the detection of fraud (and therefore part of the
fraud is already detected by the meter) our system performs
better (around 15%) when the customer has an smart meter.
In parallel to the country level campaign to detect electricity
fraud, we started to generate country level gas campaigns,
using the same algorithm (i.e. Gradient Boosting Algorithm)
The results of these campaigns, as seen in Figure 14, are also
promising, achieving 4.8x and 11.3x the baseline model.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a supervised approach to detect fraud in utility
companies. Machine learning algorithms are used to detect
patterns involving several indicators that even specialized em-
ployees have difficulty detecting. Our campaigns outperform
both the gas and electricity baseline methodology that was
being applied in both electricity and gas by an important factor.
Moreover, it uses campaign feedback to learn continued and be
aligned with not only historic but also novel fraud techniques
that may arise. It can be deployed on new populations with
relatively modest requirements (essentially, access to an initial
set of detected fraud cases).
There is of course ample room for improving on the
technical, machine learning aspect of the system (testing new
classifiers, making the system more autonomous, using differ-
ent representation of the current features as well as discovering
new useful features automatically, . . . ). As mentioned, we
believe that in the future models should be more localized (i.e.,
normalize consumption with respect to geographical areas and
similar climate, consider usage by users with the same tariff
only, etc.), and that campaigns for large populations should be
built by patching together a number of localized or specialized
models.
Another possibility to explore is provided by smart meters.
Although only monthly aggregates are being used right now,
these meters register consumption at a much higher granu-
larity, potentially providing extremely useful information for
fraud detection.
One mid-term concern in our system has to do with an
exploitation vs. exploration tradeoff. Since the system is driven
by campaign feedback, there is a risk that it tends to focus
on some niches that have given good reward in the past but
become overexploited (all customers with those patterns have
been checked), yet fails to explores other promising niches.
We are considering ways of ensuring diversity in campaigns,
perhaps introducing a randomization component.
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